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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal from the dismissal of a criminal 
information for failure to pay past-due child support presents a 
question of first impression for us.  We must determine whether 
enactment of the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 
228 (1995) ("The Act") was within the power granted to Congress 
under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution.  
Because we are convinced that the Act was the product of a lawful 
exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and 
does not transgress the Tenth Amendment, we find that the 
district court erred in holding the Act unconstitutional.  We 
will, therefore, reverse the order of the district court. 
 
 I. 
 On June 27, 1995, the United States Attorney for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania filed a criminal information 
alleging that Steven Paul Parker, a Florida resident, willfully 
failed to pay a past-due child support obligation to his two 
children in Pennsylvania in violation of the Child Support 
Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228.1 
                     
1.   The Act provides in part, as follows: 
 
(a) Offense --  Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support 





 On September 14, 1995, Parker moved to dismiss the 
information, alleging that the Act is constitutionally infirm in 
that it:  (1) falls outside the limits of the power granted to 
Congress under the terms of the Commerce Clause; and (2) 
impermissibly interferes with the states' ability to regulate 
child support and criminal law, thereby undermining the doctrine 
of federalism and violating the Tenth Amendment.  In an opinion 
and order entered on October 30, 1995, the district court agreed 
(..continued) 
another state shall be punished as provided in 
subsection (b). 
 
(b) Punishment -- The punishment for an offense under this 
section is -- 
 
(1) in the case of a first offense under this section, a fine 
under this title, imprisonment for not more than 6 
months, or both; and 
 
(2) in any other case, a fine under this title, imprisonment for 
not more than 2 years, or both. 
 
(c)  Restitution -- Upon a conviction under this section, the 
court shall order restitution . . . in an amount equal 
to the past due support obligation as it exists at the 
time of sentencing.  
 
(d)  Definitions -- As used in this section -- 
 
(1)  The term "past due support obligation" means any amount -- 
 
     (A) determined under a court order or an order of an 
administrative process pursuant to the law of a 
State to be due from a person for the support and 
maintenance of a child or of a child and the 
parent with whom the child is living; and 
 
     (B) that has remained unpaid for a period longer than one 
year, or is greater than $5,000. 
 





with Parker's arguments and dismissed the information.  This 
timely appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.  Our 
review of the district court's determination that the Act is 
unconstitutional is plenary.  United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 
273 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
 II. 
 Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the 
United States provides that "The Congress shall have power . . . 
 [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes. . . ."  The scope of 
congressional power under this section has, until recently, been 
interpreted to be virtually limitless.  The Commerce Clause 
landscape changed, however, with the Supreme Court's decision in 
United States v. Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).  
There, the Court for the first time in nearly sixty years 
invalidated a statute as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause. 
 This apparent change in course has resulted in reexamination of 
the Commerce Clause in a variety of contexts, as litigants 
attempt to persuade the courts that Lopez has breathed new life 
into statutory challenges that would, in other times, have been 
rejected summarily. 
 In Lopez, the Court considered the constitutionality of 





federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a 
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable 
cause to believe, is a school zone."  18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A).  
Evaluating the constitutionality of the statute, the Court 
established that there are "three broad categories of activity 
that Congress may regulate under its commerce power."  115 S. Ct. 
at 1629.  Congress is authorized to "regulate the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce", "regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce," and "regulate . . . 
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." 
 Id. 
 Because the Gun Free School Zone Act did not involve 
"channels" or "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce, the 
Court focused exclusively upon whether the regulated activity 
substantially affected interstate commerce.  The Court concluded 
that it did not, writing that the statute "by its terms has 
nothing to do with `commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, 
however broadly one might define those terms."  Id. at 1630.  The 
Court also found it significant that the statute did not contain 
a jurisdictional element establishing a connection to interstate 
commerce and that "[neither] the statute nor its legislative 
history contained express congressional findings regarding the 
effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school 





 Relying primarily on Lopez, the district court held the 
Child Support Recovery Act unconstitutional, rejecting the 
government's argument that the Act regulates an activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce and comprises a use of 
the channels of interstate commerce.  Specifically the court 
concluded that a willful failure to pay a court-ordered sum "has 
simply nothing to do with commerce in the context of the limited 
power given to the federal government and withheld from the 
states in the Commerce Clause."  United States v. Parker, 911 F. 
Supp. 830, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  The court also held that the Act 
did not regulate use of the channels of interstate commerce in 
that it did not apply to "the shipping of goods or the movement 
of persons in interstate commerce."  Id. at 842.  While we 
recognize that the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez establishes 
that there is, indeed, an outer limit to congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause, we do not agree with the district 
court that enactment of the Child Support Recovery Act lies 
beyond that limit. 
 In United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 577 (3d Cir. 
1995), a post-Lopez decision, we defined our mandate in cases 
challenging congressional authority under the Commerce Clause as 
follows:  "Our job . . . is not to second-guess the legislative 
judgment of Congress that [the regulated activity] substantially 
affects interstate commerce, but rather to ensure that Congress 





requisite rational basis may be supported by an Act's legislative 
history and by the interstate elements of a crime.  We also 
adopted a broad definition of commerce, rejecting the notion that 
the Supreme Court in Lopez created a bright line rule 
establishing that unless an activity is commercial or economic it 
is beyond the reach of Congress under the Commerce Clause.  Even 
"local activities may become the subject of national legislation 
when they are found to be part of a national problem with a 
substantial impact upon interstate commerce."  Id. at 584. 
 In light of both the decision in Lopez and our own 
precedent, we are convinced that the Child Support Recovery Act 
falls within the scope of congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause as a valid regulation of activity having a 
substantial effect upon interstate commerce.  In so holding we 
align with our sister courts of appeals which have evaluated and 
rejected constitutional challenges to the Act.  See United States 
v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Mussari, 95 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1996); and United States v. Sage, 
92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996).2  We find the reasoning articulated 
                     
2.   A majority of the district courts outside the Second, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits which have considered challenges to the 
Child Support Recovery Act have upheld the Act's 
constitutionality.  See United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp 911 
(E.D. Va. 1996); United States v. Sims, 936 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. 
Okla. 1996); United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093 (D. R.I. 
1996); United States v. Ganapowski, 930 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Pa. 
1996); United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D. Fla. 
1996); United States v. Bongiorno, Crim. No. 94-10178-REK, 1996 
WL 208508 (D. Mass. Jan. 25, 1996); United States v. Hopper, 899 





in these decisions to be persuasive and adopt it here.  
Accordingly our analysis is brief.   
 As we noted in Bishop, "we . . . must give substantial 
deference to a Congressional determination that it had the power 
to enact particular legislation."  66 F.3d at 576.  Several 
factors convince us that the Child Support Recovery Act falls 
within the line drawn by the Supreme Court in Lopez.  First, by 
its terms, the Act is confined to interstate transactions; it 
addresses the obligation of one parent to make payments in 
interstate commerce for a child living in a different state.  
These payments will normally move in interstate commerce by mail, 
by wire, or by electronic transfer. 
 The activity regulated by the Act falls within the 
broad definition of commerce which we adopted in Bishop.  Failure 
to make required payments gives rise to a debt which implicates 
economic activity.  This is an instance where "local activities . 
. . are . . . part of a national problem with a substantial 
impact upon interstate commerce."  Id. at 584.  It is significant 
that the legislative history underlying the Act establishes that 
state efforts have been inadequate to ensure that payments owed 
are actually made and that, as a result, annual obligations 
covered by the Act total billions of dollars.  Finally, unlike 
the statute the Court reviewed in Lopez, the Child Support 
(..continued) 
Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995).  But see United States v. Bailey, 902 





Recovery Act involves an unbroken chain of interstate events 
which begins when one parent crosses state lines and ends with 
interstate collection efforts. 
 
 III. 
 We also reject Parker's argument that the Child Support 
Recovery Act undermines the doctrine of federalism and violates 
the Tenth Amendment.  In light of our holding that the Act is the 
product of a legitimate exercise of congressional authority under 
the Commerce Clause, this argument fails.  "If Congress acts 
under one of its enumerated powers -- here its power under the 
Commerce Clause -- there can be no violation of the Tenth 
Amendment."  United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d at 791.  The Act 
does not "threaten[] the existence or significance of the states 
or interfere[] with the existence of their powers."  United 
States v. Sage, 92 F.3d at 106.  "All the Act does is enable the 
United States to help [the states] do what [they] could not do on 
[their] own, namely enforce [the] obligation to send money from 
one state to another."  Id. at 105. 
 
 IV. 
 Because we are convinced that the Child Support 
Recovery Act was enacted pursuant to the authority granted to 





and does not violate the terms of the Tenth Amendment, we will 








TO THE CLERK: 
 Please file the foregoing opinion. 
 
    _____________________________ 
        Circuit Judge   
